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I~ has long been a contenU.on of underdeveloped countri.f~S c1nd even of
relatively developed ones, that th~ emign1tion of hinhly ~k:i.lled personnel
constj_tutes a serious loss which the country sho;,,,lcl try to mi.n:l.m:i.ze.

While

the idea has seldom been expressed in highly theoretical terms, most peoi:,le
have accepted it intuitively and hnrdly questioned the underlying theory.
Recently, however, the_ generally acceptec1 point of: vim, has been called 5.nto
question by Grubel and Scott, 1 who argue that under rnost circuuistnnces t:here

is no lo_ss to the non··migrants as a result of emraigration, even of highly sk:q
lecl pen1onnel, from a given country.

The present discussion attempts to analyze .in considerable detai:I. the
. condit5.ons uncle:::- which loss to the remaining popuJ.ation?. will occur, con-

It is concluded that, in general, loss does o~cur, although there are~ few

~ases where gain (or no chan~e)· may result.

In the firs£ case discussed, ~tis assumed thEt the emigration is a
once and for all affair and that the supply of resources to the domestic cco.,
ncmy is perfectly inelastic.

Because of the latter asst1rnption, this case

may be thought of as referring to the very short run,. in which resource.
. sep:_:ilies do not adjust

to the itnpact of the migratiou.

It is a relatively

··, . i..G:cubel, Herbert B. and Anthony D. Scott, "The Internat:l.onal Flmt of
-.Human Capit&l, 11 Amed.can~~~£..~_£H11:i.c Review, }fay 1966.
2It is assmL1e::l that the emizrants theuselves gain from the move; the
welfare function with whith we are concerned deals solely with non-migrants
and disregr.:rJs an individuEtl as soon as he migrates. · Problems are irr.pJ.ic.it
in this definition but we will not go into detail about them,
Since the emigrants are excluded from the national welfare function, it
is particularly necess~ry to assume away interpersonal. utility effects be
tmc!en e~1igrants and their friends or fanili.es who do noi.: emigr6t_e. Al t1wu.3)1
viit~ally 211 of co □ s~raer theory is ba~ed on the ~ssu~~iicm of indepzndent
utility functions, such an assumption may ·bs pariicul~~l.y ill-suited to the
analysis of the 1uestion at hand, and ~ill be relaxed in this paper.·

-2simple case; the major determinarit s of the extent of gain or loss are (a) the
ratio of per cent of all capital held by emigrants to per cent of all labor
supplied by emigrants, and (b) the amount of their physical capital which the
emigrants take with them.

It is clear also that srich things as the existence

of: external effects related to the emig:rants, or increasing returns to scale,

can affect the results but the only interesting question is whether such ef
fects are quantitativ ely importa_nt, since their d:trect:l.ort is theoretical ly
obviow; ..
The analysis becomes more complex when readjustmen t of factor supplies

and factor proportions to the migration is allowed for.

If there are only

two factors, the results depend on the relative scvings propensitie s of emi•grants an~1 non~emigran ts, and on whether the ernigr;u1ts take their capital
with th~n or not.

Results are suwnarize<l in Table 2, farther on.

When there

are three or more factors (permitting the distinction between skilled and unskilled labor) the result depends jointly on the relative savings propensities,_ the skill levels of migrants and non-migr~n ts, the ease of transformin g
unskillE:d into skilled labor, and the existence of government subsidies to
education.

--

·The Short-Run-. Effects
of Emigration
..
.,.____
.
--

following:

perfect markets, no external effects, constant returns to scale,
I

independent utility functions (:i.n the sense that one person's indifferenc e
level_ does not affect that of another person), and a two-factor world, in
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which.one factor is capital and the other is homogeneous labor.

Factors are

continuously substitutable and prices are flexible so that factor markets a;:e
always cleared.

The marginal utility of income is assumed to be equal for

all owners of factors of production.

The effects of an emigration on the income of the non-emigrants depends
· on the way in which the ownership of the capital stock is distributed among
the people in the country, and whether the emierants tAke their phys:i.cal capi
tal with them or receive instead the remuneration corresponding to the return
on physical capital, which they leave behind thE!m.
Assume fhst the simplest possible case in which none of the laborers
who miorate own any of the capital stock.
'

0

Here it is clear that as long as

the rna;:ginal physical productivity of labor is declining, the individuals
left in the country after the migration are worse off than they were before
it. · This is illustrated diagrammatically in Figure I,

The marginal phy

s!.c<Jl p:roduct · of labor curve is designated by MPPL,·and the initial labor
stock, measured on the horizoi1tal axis, is

OL1.

Total product is given by

the area benecith the marginal physical product of labor _curve, i.e., OACL1.
Suppose now that

1 21.1

workers emigrate reducing the labor force to

The new total product of the economy is given by the area
the original equilibrium wage rate was
OF.
is
fore
is

OL\BL 2 •

OL2.

Hhereas

OE, the new and higher wage rate is

Since the migrants.ow,n no capital stock, their income1 before migrating
L2DcL 1 •
OACDL2 •

The income of the rest of the population at this time is there
After the migration the income of the remaining inhabitants

OABL , less than their original level by the triangle
2

BCD.

Note th~t in this case, the avera~e
_ inccme ·p_Pr
- pPrs
-- 01,, 1·.n

t'ne

na t"ion ( ,., h~,.c l1

corresponds to a _different set of people before and after the migrat:t"on),

Out:put
of

Goods

.
of Labor
Quantity
.
Fi3urc 1

...

-5-incr~ases c1s a result of the migration, even though the avera~,,;e income:: of that
particular set of persons remaining in the co~ntry _is lowered . 1

This super

ficial paradox can be explained by the fact that-the emigrants (since they
owned no capital) had a below average income level before their migration.
Consider now an alternative in which the- ownership of the capital stoc!,
is equally distributed among all the individuals in the population, each of
whom also belongs to the labor force which, as before, is assumed to be homogeneous.

Assume also that an individual who lec1ves the country still owns

his cap Hal and receives the appropriate factor payment.

Again we ask our-··

selves whether the income per person of the set of ind:i.viduals remaining in
the country is greater before or after the emig~ation,
Define

again.

11

such that

equals

Consider Figure 1

l , i.e.,
.
suppose thRt one
11

nth

of the population has decided to emigrate.

This tells us that the in-

come of the non-migrating group before the migration occurred was equal to
X

+ n·-1
n

(Z

+

Y + T),

to the nrea ABF ,
area

Y

where

X

is equal to the· area

is equal to the area_

FBDE ,

and

OEDLz,
T

z is equal

is equd to the

BCD • After the migration has occurred the "income of the remaining

population is giv~n by

X + Y + E:l. (Z) •
n

It is easy to show that the in-

come before the migration is in this case less than the income after the
--- _ l __ ,____

We assume implicitly throughout this paper that there is a constant
r4tio between the labor force and the total population both as between
emigrants and non--emigrants and through time, To the extent that this is
not true, conclusions which can be drawn as to the effects on the inco,n~
per worker do not ililply parallel statca12nts as to the e£fects on incor,1e
per pe-;.-so,t.
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The conclusion th6t emigration ian help the remaining population only if
the emigrants we;:-e owners of some capital stock, but is sure to hurt the re-maining population H the emigrants did not hold any capital stock, · is at first
sight rather paradoxical.

One might have expected that since the emigration

of labor increases the capital labor ratio that the remaining inhabitants wouJ.tj
But it is here that the distinction must be

be better off in the latter case.

carefully 1wde between changes in the income level of the group of people who
were in the country before the emigration and st.ill there after it, and clwnges
i11 the avcrai:;e income level of all ~he people in the countr.y. he.fore the en1:'.'.

grat ion and all the people in the country after it.

The average income of the

people in the country c1t the respective before and after dates does increase

lFor this to be true we require only that
Y

+

n-1

(Z)

> n -1

·n

(Z + Y

+

T).

n

n-1
Subtracting

n

(Z)

from each side we get:
Y

> n-1 (Y + T) ,
n

which reduces to:

Y.

> (n-l)T •

It is obvious from Figure 1 that this inequality holds.
2The analysis of this section has been based on the assumption that the

marginal physical product curve of labor is declining throughout its entire
range. It is clear that our conclusion that the non-emigrants are worse off
if the emigrants hold no cc1pit_al stock is not qualified by the shc1pe of the _
marginal physico.l productivity curve, as long as there is 8.n equilibr.iu2 where
the. curv2 is dc;•:rn-i2rd sloping. Since distribution theory bi:eclks · doun if this
is not true we c2.n limit ourselves to this case. Hhen the er:iignmts do o,._1n
the same amount of capital per. p~rson a~ the non-emigrants, the result just.
achieved can be re-versed, .even when an e·qu:i.librium exists.

- 7..

as a result of the emigra tion, but this is consis tent with a dec:cea
se in the
income of the set of people who remain in the country .
Given the·two cases just discuss ed, It is clear that there exists in
this
model some ratio of m-mersh:i.p of cap_ita l per emigra nt to owners hip of
capita l
per non-em ig:rant at which the non-em igrants Hill be left just ·as well
off as
they were before the migrat ion.

This situati on occurs when the per cent of all

1,2

y

capita l held by the non-em igrants is equal to

y

+

T

......

This conditi on

implies that non-em igrants hold a larger per capita share of the capita
l stock
than ernig·,.·ants. 3

Let

a=%

of all capita l stock held by non-em igrants .

Then the incomes of non-em igrants , before migrat ion and after migrat
ion re
spectiv ely, can be represe nted as folloi·lS :
_before :

X

+

a (Z

after:

X

+

Y

+

aZ

T) :::: Y

+

aZ ,

+

Y

+

T)

For equali ty we require

+

a(Z

i.e.,

a::::

Y

+

_Y_
y +·T

2

When the HPP curve of labor is not a decrea sing functio n of_ labor input
through out its entire range, the critica l distrib ution of capita l stock
which
has the proper ty·tbat emigra tion w{ll not affect the incomes of non-em
igrants
will differ from the case treated here.
3 .

.
The propor tion of non-em igrants in
the "b efore migrat io~' popula tion is

n-1
n

.
1 it
. is
' seen tat
F rom F igure
h

n-1 =- ED

If the propor tion of the
n
EC
total capita l stock held by non-em igrants j.s
_:x.__ then the per cc.pita hold
Y+T
ing of capita l stock by non-em igrants is larger than that by ei.11ig;:.·.:1nts,
sir;ce,
_'L_

> ED

Y+T -

EC

or

_!_ >. n-1
Y+T
n
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Until now it has been assumed that if an emigrant did own .physical capital
Consider

or the rights to it he_did not take it with him when he emigrated.
now the case where the emigrant does take his capital with him, l

In this con

text the fol low:i.ng proposition is very useful:
Given constant returns to scale, whenever a bundle of factors
is removed from an economy and the relative amo~nts of the
different factors in that bundle are not the same as the relative amounts of the factors in the economy as a whole before
the removal, then the average income of the individuals left
in the economy after the migration will be lower than it was
before; if the relative· proportions are the same, th8 ,tVerage
incorne of the individuals left in the economy will be unchanged .2, 3
Applying this pro?o~{tion to the extreme cases, we conclude that if a
group of laborers ,-iho own no capital stock leaves then there is a decrease
in the inco:ne of the remaining population (as we have already sec above);
on the other hand, if the entire ~tock of physical cap.itaJ. is removedJ again
the aver.-ige income of the remaining population ts decreased. · Hore generally,
1When human capital is introduced its departure along with the basic labor
component must clearly be allowed for. In.the case of physical capital, if
the emigrant sells a stock, for example, this may lead to a decrease of the
country's capital stock in the long run, as stock flotation becomes more ex
pensive. The result, therefore, may be the s.:imc as if he had "carried" the
·
stoclt off with him.
2It is assume~ throughout this paper that any non-labor factors which
leave the country as a result of t;he migration are owned by the migrants them- •
selves.
3This proposition is a sort of analogue of the general theorem in inter
national·trade that whenever trade in goods or movements of factors between
two previously closed econornj_es is made possible then the income of each eco
nomy is increased as a result of the contact with the other one, provided
that fcictor proportions were not th,~ same in th~ two econoiT!ies b0fore trc,de.
But if factol:" propo:::-tions w,•.re the sar.:e before the opening up of trade then
no trade or factor movement will occur and no gaics will be reap2d.

-9whenever the labor and capital which leave the economy are not in the sc1m~
proportion as in the pre-migrati on economy then there is a decrease in the
. i

per capita income of the remaining population. 1·
The results of this section are sum.111arized in Table 1.

The Case_ of Hore Than THo Factors
The existence of different types of labor~ or the existence of land as
a factor of production changes the analysis to the extent thatiit may no
longer be possible to assume that the area under the marginal productivit y
curve of the factor is equal to the total output.

The shape of such a mar

ginal physical productivit y curve depends on the extent to which other factors are substitutab le for or complementa ry with the factor in question.

If

s01ne other type of labor is a very close substitute, then the marginal pro-·
cluctiYity cu:cve wUl be relatively .flat.

If the factor has no close substi

tutes, then its marginal physical productivit y curve will tend to be more
.steeply sloped.
The originai conclusions which were drm,h from Figure I in the case of
a homogeneous labor force which owned no capital remain true in the case of
any sub-sector of the labor force whose merabe:rs do not qwn capital.

Whenever

a non-margina l proportion of this labor force emigrates the loss triangle

appears.

Someone in the remaining population must be worse off.

It is not

possible to perform the same simple diagrammati c analysis of the effects on
the remaining population if the type of labor that emigrates does indeed own
capital; for thL:; one Hould need a more c01,1plicated production function

lrt is clear that our results here, as in previous sections, would be
~edified if there were either increasing returns to scale or decreasi.ng re
turns to scale in the economy. In general, the loss .resulting from ths
dcp~rture of any· factor would be greater if there were increaiing returns
ancI less if the:re were decreasing returns.

Table 1

Sm,!mary of Resul Ls in the Short-R un or Static
Case with Two ·Factor s

Capita l Owned Pei Person
by Emig.E.._a_n_t_s___
Capita l Owned Per Person
by Non-Em igrants

.Emigr ants Don't
Take Capita l

II)

0

< C>(< 1

Emigra nts Take.

Capita l

II)

(l)

Q)

II)

II)

l"J

Cu

C:J

(!)

~~

1-1

u

u

c::

c::

•.-!

•.-!

II)
II)

II)
V).

0

0

,...:i

t--1

No change

No change

C\ >

1

Cl)

Cl)

Q)

Q)

Cl)

Cl)

ru

Cu

Cl)

Q)

1--,

1-1

u

u

c::

i;::
•.-!

•.-!

c::

Cl)
Cl)

•.-!
c;j

c.,

0

,,

t--1

1. o( == Ratio of Capita l Owned Per Person by Emigra nts to Capita l
.Dwned Per
Person by Non-Em igrants ..

Note: "Gain" and "Loss" as elsewh ere in this paper, refer only
to the non-
emigra nts.
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approach in which all types of labor and capital were introduced and the

ef

fects of the departure of a certain number of a particular type of labor could
be calculated.

In any c.sse, however, the conceptual apparatus which one must

use is relatively clear-cut and sinple.

The Long Run: The Dynamic Stationary ·Economy;
Educational Costs

Factor Proportions Analysis and

So far, it ha<> been assumed that the total stock of each factor is fixed
in a timeless soit of ~ay, with changes occurring only as a result of migration,

and with these changes not being made up

for in any t..vay afterw2rcls, as, for

example through the creation of more of a factor when its price rises.

Consider

now a model which, although still a very oversimplified version of reality,
permits the introduction and analysis of some of the longer run effects of
emigration.

It is a stationary equilibrium.model in which, in the absence

·of emigration, it is assumed tlrnt although people are born and die and fac
tories are built and wear outJ all fhe aggregate variables like the labor
force and the capital stockl in the country are constant over time.

The Two Factor Case
If, in the sort of long run model just postulated,there are only two
1

This assumption is consistent with a situation in which the typical
individual ends his life with the same capital stock as he started it. One
can assume that thf~e is no bequeathing, in whicfi case individuals will
usually save during periods ,:hen their incomes are high and dissave in the
latter part of their lives. The sacie sort of r~lationship between the life.time pattern of income ancl that of conscmption would presumably hold also
where each individual received a bequest from his parents and passed the
same amount on to his children. One must make one of these two assumptions
of the system would not be a stationary on2.

-11-

factors, and emigrants do not retain investments in the country after dcpartine,

it is Jhe relative saving.5 propensities of the '.emigrants and non-emigrants
which play the role taken in the short-run case by the relative amounts of
capital held.

The result is analogons; whenever the ~verage saving propen-

sity of the emigrants is different from that of the non-emignmts, then the
latter lose as a result of the emigration.

hssumc that there is no bequeath

ing so that saving is done only in order to redistribute the pattern of an
individual's consumption over his life.

If a group does no saving at all,

it has a~ over-life consumption pattern identical to its income pattern,
group ~fl1ich saveB has a different patt~rn of incdme and consumption.

A

During

the early working years, income is greater than consumption so that net
.saving is taking place.

During the last years of life dissaving occurs . 1

f;n ahove 2verage savings propensity means that with a given interest rate

an individual saves more than the representative individual during his life and

by implication, in the case ~hen no bequeathing occurs, dissaves faster during
the -latter part ol his life. 2

The absolute amount saved depends on the

mar-

ginal efficiency of capital,the greater the rate of return on savings in
terms of intreased consumption at a later time, the grea~er will usually
be the total amount of saving done.3

Thus this case differs from the short

run case in that savings (and hence capital formation) are linked to the rate
lit: is assmned that net domestic sav:i.ngs fi.nances investment in real
capital in the economy (an<l not in other countries) so that the total capital
stock at any given time is equal to the total of all net savings to date,
2 1£ bequec1thing is done for the economy
as a whole, a high savings p1.·o
pensity would be reflected in a high equilibrium level of wealth given the
rate of interest.
3 It is true, of course, that there is an income effect as well as a
price effect of the chan3es in the rate of interest; hm-iever, the case where
savings are a decreasing function of tbe rat~ of interest i.s not treated here.
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of interest so that the capital a person holds is not given exogenously but
rather dep~nd.s on

market forces.

It is still possible, however, to dis-

. tinguish high and low savers or capital holders, even when the amounts of
capital are not fixed.
Suppose that the economy is made up of t\/O equally large sets of indi-·
viduals ,- _one of which has a high savings tendency and the other a low one.
In all other respects they are the same.

Consider Figure 2 • MPPK

marginal physical productivit y of capital curve.

ST

is the

is tlxe supply curve of

11
loam1blc funds (or what might be called the "willingnes s to hold weal th )

from the group with the high propensity to save and
curve of the low s,rvers.

VW isthe correspondi ng

The equilibrium capital stock is

OK

1

and the

returns to capital are

equilibrium rate of interest is

OC

given by the c:irea designated by

OCRK 1 , ·while the rest of the area under

~

The total

the marginal physical productivit y of capital-curv e corresponds to the re
muneration of labor.
Now assume, to take a simple case, that all of the high savers emigrate.
Since the curve
saving

VH

has an intercept above

at all before the emigration.

C, the non-emigran ts dicl no

Nou with one half ~f the labor having

emigrated, the ne,•! marginal physical productivit y of capital curve can be
designated by

MPPK •

The precise relationshi p between this curve and the

original marginal. physical productiyit y of capital curve depends on the pro
duction function; however, given the assumption of constant returns to scale,
it is obvious that if the amount of capital stock were one half of
i.e.,

OK1 ,

OK2 , then the total product of the economy would be one half of its

original level.

Hence, the area above the line

CR

and beneath the

Cltrve
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A
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~
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.w.
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CJ
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v
C
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.
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K

s

Quantity of Capital
Fir;urc 2
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CAR •

would be one--h tl1.f of the areo

l-1PPK_' , (C!iH)

I
will be less than

In fact, the c·api tal stock

0K2 _sinc e at the rate of inter est

all.
rentl y livin g in the coun try do not save at

The equil ibriu m capit ~l

poin t
sical prod uctiv ity of capit al curve , i.e., the

given by the area

01\FK. 3

the peop le cur-

cross es the new marg inal phy-

stock is deter .mine d by the poin t at which · VH

. brium ~api tal stock is given by

CC

F

Hence the equi li-

Tota l incom e in tbe econo my is now

0K3

the
The amou nt accru ing to the non-e migra nts in

form of wage paym ents iG given by

!1FP

The retur n to capit al is given by

migra nts befor e the emi
Comp are, now, the level of ,-,elf are of the nan-e
grati on and after it.
the areo

CAH

given hy
The paym ent recei ved befo re the migr ation is

and the paym ent accru ing nfter ward s by

0i\FK3 •

Supe rfici ally,

in the latte r case, but such a
it appe ars that th0 we] far.e level is grea ter
that the non-e migra nts, in order
comp ariso n fails to take accou nt of the fact
to main tain the capit al stod~

01(3 ,

have ha<l to chang e. the time: patte rn of

their consu raptio ri fro:n what it was _befo re.

Each indiv idual now saves durin g

runs down his asset s durin g the
the early part of his incom e earni ng life and
of inter 
In the pre-e migr ation econo ray, ·with a rate

later part of his life.
est given by

prefe rred to
0C, this set of indiv idual s did no savin g but

consu me curre ntly their total incom e of

CAM .

Part of the incre ased in-

a paym ent neces sary to per.:.
come which they recei ve in the secon d case is

.

their lives and dissa ve durin g
suade them to save durin g the early part of
nt incom e throu ghou t their
the latte r part, rathe r than consu me their curre
lives .
are.a

amm atica lly by the area
The amou nt of this paym ent can be shown diagr
0VFK.3

in the econo ny
It is the arnou·nt by \·1hich the asset -•h0l ders

•

feel .themselves to be worse of:f when they have to hold assets (:i.,e., postpone consumption) for one more period,

In the original case such postponing

never occurred; hence it is necessary to subtract out this amount (OVFK3)
from the t:otal_ income accruing to the non-emigrants before making the
parison with the pre-migration income.
CAM

is -VAF

com

The area which must be compared with

which is clearly the smaller of the two,

Hence, the non-

emigrants are in a worse position than they were before the emigration occurred,
- To distinguish bet·ween this adjusted income level and the unadjusted one,
we henceforth des:i.gn2ted the former as

11

permanent income,"

Figure 2 sinply illustrates the general proposition that whenever the
emigrants h~ve an ayerage savings tendency different from that of the non
emigrants, then the non-emigrant~ are worse off than before. This proposition
is further clcrificd in Figure 3, which differs from Figure 2 only in that
varying savings propensities on the part of the emigrants and non-eQigtants
arc considered.
held fixed.

SNZ , the total supply curve of loanable funds is, hm-1ever,

Let the supply curve of loanable funds for "low savers" be

and let it cut the line
supply an amount of funds

CR

so that at the interest rate

OC

the low savers

CB·. The supply curv~ of the h~gh savers can be

derived as the horizontal distance between

SZ

and

LL' , i.e.,

SHH'

welfare measure for the low savers before any emigration occurs is now
LCB

and for the high savers

ACN

+ SCJ

"welfc1re" of the low savers would becor.1e
of

OKl~ •

LL1

Our
ACH

If the high savers emigrate, the
L,\Q

with an equilibrium capital stock

.

L

This is lm1er than the pre-emigration rfhcome by the area

BQN •

If the low savers emigrate, the income of the high savers who would then be
left wou'.d beco.:r:,2

+

S,\E , less than the original incoi:le by

IDE

•

It is

-14aA _l

:J
t)

0

:-,

0

.IJ

c::

H

l.;-j

0

/

0

/

-IJ

c;J

~

C

L

s

0

Quauiity of Capital
Fisurc 3

-15-

clear that the non-em igrants lose in all possib le cases except when
SHH'

LL'

and

coincid e (at least at the intere st rate OC ); but this is precise ly
the

case in which they do bave the same savings propen sities.
Thus far we have assumed that emigra nts have done what is equiva lent
to
taking their capita l with them, i.e., they have not retaine d investm
ents in
the country , but have sold them to non-em igrants , thus using
up some of the

savings of the latter group.
In the case where the two groups have the same savings propen sities
and
the emii;ra nts do not take their physic al capita l with them, the
non-em igrants

may be benefi ted by the emigra tion.

The capita l left in the country by the

emigra nts increas es the capita l-labor ratio and reduce s its own rate
of re
turn.

The Eituat ion is illustr ated in Figure 4.

One-ha lf of the popula tion

has emigra ted and the margin al phusic al produc tivity of capita l curve
and
letteri ng are those of Figure 3.

The supply curve of loanab le funds of the

·non-em igrants is given by the line
ductiv ity curve at the point

SD, which cuts the margin al physic al pro

M due to the assump tion that the tendenc y to

save is the same for emigra nts and non-em igrants .

In other words, if none of

the emigra nts' capita l had remaine d in the country the equilib rium
rate of
intere st wot1ld have been at its origin al level of

OC •

The income of the

non-em igrants , the sum of the wages which accrued to the non-em igrants
before
emigra tionJ (CAH)" and tJ-ie .gain from their contrib ution to the capita
l stock
I

(SCM) would 1ikewi se have been at its origina l level. · That some of
the capital belong ing to the emigra nts remain s in the country can be represe
nted by
the fact that the total supply curve of loanab le funds
right of

SD .

The new equilib rium

raJ~c

ST' , will lie to the

of interes t is given by

OG

and the

total wage bill accruin g to the non-e:n fgrants is nm.; given by the area
GAN.
The net gain due to their contrib ution to the capita l stock is now
given by

.. '
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It is obviou s that the latter income (SGU

former (SCL-1

+

CAM:) the differe nce being the area

+

G,\N) is greate r than the

UNN •

Table 2 summar izes the conclu sions in this long-ru n two-fa ctor case.
The Two-Pl us Factor Case:

Differ ent Labor Skills

Consid er now the possib ility that; emigra nts and non-em igrants may
differ}
not only with respec t to saving s propen sities; but also with respec
t to skill
levels . · _Unskil led labor can be transfo rmed into skilled labor by
educat ional
investm ent.

When the station ary dynamic model, which _is th~ curren t framew ork

of analys is, is in <lynani.c equilib rium, the only investm ent ocCLirr
ing in e<lu-.
cation is that require d to offset depl2ti ons in the stock of skilled
labor
through rei:irerr ,ent and death.

1£ the assump tions made through out the paper

(intern al factor mobili ty, perfec t market s, etc.), are expande d to
include
perfec t foreslz ht and no risk aversio n, the transfo rmatio n of one
type of
labor into anothe r by means of educati on would occur automa tically
up to the
point where the benefi ts and costs accruin g ih the future, discou
nted by the
rate of intere st, would just equal the curren t costs of the educat
ional pro
c;::-.ss.

Each individ ual wculci take care

o[

to maximi ze his discou nted income stream .

his own educati on in such a way as
What then would happen in this

station ary economy if either a tempora ry or a continu ing outflow
of one type
of labor occurs?
It can be shown that if emigra nt and non-em igrant savings propen sities
are the same, and if unskil led l~bor is transfo rmable at a consta
nt cost into
skilled labor, any emigra tion of either skilled or unskill ed labor
will not
affect income per person for the non-em igrants as long as it is•fore
seen so
that the time lag involve d in educati on does not leave factor propor
tions
differe nt from their long-r~ n equilib rium values .

If skilled labor is

-16aTable 2
The Two Facto r Dynamic Statio nary Case
Savin r;s Pr~_Pe~~sitv of Em!B.E~E.

Savin gs Prope nsity of Non
Emigr ants

Emigr ar{ts Take
Cap_i tal

'

Emigr ants Leave
Their Capit al

..,!\.

Cl)

Cl)

aJ

(ii

Cl)

0

t~
Cil
d

Cil
CJ

<R < 1

H

H

u
:::

H

Cl)
Cl)

0

H.

R -- 1

R

>

H

i:::

•,-I
(ti

C.')

No ch&nge

1

No chang e

Cl)

(l)
Cl)

Cil
(l)

H

u

i:::

H

Cl)

Ci)

0

H

1.

t)

i:::

Cl)

(l)
Cl)

Cu

CJ
,,_,

t)

i:::·
H
C/)
C/)

0

,-l

R = Ratio of Savin gs Prope nsity of Er.ii3 rants to Savin
gs Prope nsity of Non
Emig rants.
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emigrating then the educational sector will have to be larger to make sure
that even after the emigration the ratio of skilled labor to unskilled labor
and to physical capj_tal is the same as it would be in the absence of the
migration,

If unskilled labor emigrates) the educational sector will, con-

v ersely, have to be smaller.

If there are

11

increasing costs 111 to educating higher and higher propor

tions ~f the population (or absolute numbers) to skilled levels, then emi
gration of skilled workers implies loss to the non-emigran ts even in the
long run; emigration of unskilled workers implies a gain.

These results

are reversed :i.f there are decreasing costs in education.
Govcrnment__ Subsj_c1ies to Education
With free capital markets and no risk aver~ion, one wovld expect each
individual to take care of his oim education in such a way as to maxiraize
his overall discounted productivit y.

Because individuals are risk ave,:se

or lack information , and capital markets are not perfect) it is usually be-

lieved that the amount ·of investment in education which would occur without
any government assistance would be less than the optimal amount.

As a

result) the gove~nment intervenes, and gives educational subsidies.
Such a situation suggests in some sense that the loss to the remaining
population cis a result of emigration of skilled personnel will be greater
1 In the present context, by
increasing costs we mean to include not only
the possibility that total costs r_nay rise faster than the r.t.:nber of people edu
cated because of decreasing returns to thQ industry with the innate quJlity
of .students constant (a rather implausible event) but also that as more and
more people are educated, the additional students arc less and less suitable
and hence do not gain as much fro □ a givei1 level of educational cost.

,.:

-18·-

than ·it was in the preceding ana~ysis,

The emi3ratio n of an individua l who

has borne his own education al expenses is one thing;· whatever decrease in
consumpti on had to be sustained in order that he ~e educated was borne by
himself.

Howe:ver, when a subsidy policy is in effect the decrease in con

sumption which finances the investmen t in education is borne to a large
degre~ by the populatio n which~ii ll remain after the emigrant leaves.

This

particula r part of the loss to the remaining populatio n is equal to the
total governmen t subsidy gbing into the education of the emigrants .
Interdepen den_t Utility Func_t._ion~
If each individua l is thought of as a unit whose welfare is independe nt
of that of every other individua l, then the non-emig rant populatio n as a.
\·1hole loses a p:eatcr amount when the uigrants' e<lu.u1tion has been ~uIJ.sj_
dized than when this is not the case.

Suppose, hm•:ever, thc>.t the. men,ber s

of a particula r family tend to think of their welfare as a whole.

The

parents are happier if the children are well off.

2

In this case if

father pays for the education of his son 1 the fa~her may not feel any worse
off if the son eventuall y emigrates than he would if the son remained in
his own country.

Hhether the father pays for the e_ducation of his son di

rectly, or indi!:ectl y through a tax and benefits system via the governmen t,
makes no real differenc e.

As long as the distribut ion of benefits from

public education is propo_rtio nal t~ the taxes which result from the need
to make these e:-:pe.nditm ::es, the far:iil ies of the non-emigr ants are in essence
paying for the education of their children and the families of the emigrants
are pciyinr; for the: education of their children.

Clearly, then, the f& ..1ilies

-19-

of the non-emigrants are not hurt by the migration since they have not in
!

fact helped to pay for the education of the emigra~ts' children,

Similarly,

the families of the ~migrants have not lost, since by assumption, they
would be just as happy to have their children educated and then leave the
country as to have them educ:ated and stay in it.

In this case there is no

"subsidization" loss from migration. 1
. The same conclusion holds even when, as a result of the emigration,
the governm-2nt increases the number of children receiving education.

The

non-emigrants continue to pay a proportion of the total educational bill
equal to the per cent of all students being educated who are from their
families,

Although the total tax bill for purposes of education is higher

for the non"'"emigrants than before, more of their children are being edu
cated.

These two factors just offset each other. 2

To the extent, of

course, that the extra children who have to be educated as a result of
the dep~rture of the emigrants are less suited than the ones educated first,
the economy as a whole suffers a loss.

This loss possibility

has already

been considered (increasing costs of education); there is no added loss as
1 It must be borne in mind that there may be loss due to changed factor
proportions, different savings propensities, etc., but that we are here con
cerned ~nlv with whether there is a further loss..- due to government subsidization,·
2we assume that the government is, as before, ensurini that-optimal number of childr,en be educated. It is probable that the non-emigrants would
be unwilling to increa-se ·their savings (either directly or through taxes paid •
to the government) sufficiently ,to maintain the same factor proportions(among
physical capital, skilled labor and unskilled labor) as before. Thi.s fact
has its own welfare implications, i.e., those already discussed above. The
"effective rate" of savings of the group of fa;niJ. ies whose children emigrate
will be decreased by the emigration inasmuch as this human capital is lost
to the economy, so that the f.;railies of the non-emig_rants would gain or lqse
on· this account accorc1.ing to whether their savings propensities_ were, re
spectively: higher or lower than th2 r- 0£ the families of the e:rigrants.
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a result of the fact that governm ent subsid ies for educati on are
a feature of
the situati on.
It is clear that in tho analys is of this problem it is not safe to
use
the assump tion of an indepen dent utility functio n for each individ
ual.

If one

assumes that parents receive an increas e in utility suffici ent to
compe~ sate
them for the costs of educati ng their childre n, then the conclus ion.
that
governm ent educat ional subsid ies to people who emigra te result in
a loss to
the remain ing popula tion is not valid.
by the use of ecoaorn ic theory.

The problem clearly cannot be solved

The implic ations of the two types of utility

functio ns on the part of th~ emigra nts' familie s are differe nt with
respec t
to the optima l gove~nm ent educat ional strateg y in a situati on where
emigra 
tion is likely to occur.

Hhen the familie s of the ~migra nts

c!l"C

paying (in

a sense volunt arily) for the educat ion of their childre n with the
governm ent
acting as an interme diary

(and one form of labor is tr2nsfo rmable into

another at constan t costs), then the implic ations for governm ental
policy
are fairly straigh tforuar d.

There is no loss to non-em igrants th1:ough sub-

sidies to emigra nts no matter how large the educat ional sector inthe
country
is or how r:iany people emigra te, (assumi ng th_at the governm errt acts
with fore
sight so that it is never caught off-gua rd by a sudden wave of emigra
nts).
Indepen dent Utility Functio ns
The implica tions for governm ent policy are conside rably n~re compli
cated

when the opposi te extrea~ assump tion is made; nnmely, that the familie
s of
the emigra nts are just as unwilli ng to pay for the educati on of their
children as are the familie s of non-e;::1ig1: 2.nts.
the possib ility of emigra tion, it may not

Uncle:!." these assun:ri tions and given
r)av

'

,

the governm ent to give as larr,e

-21subsidies as in a situation where emigration does not occur; or conversely,
it may pay the government to educate more people'.
To make this analysis

n

little more pr·ecise, assume that the emigration

occurs in response to a w2ge differential between the country in question
and countries to which the ~migrants go.

The probabili.ty that any one indi

vidual will emigrate can be assumed to be an increasing function of this dif
ferential.

Suppose the optimal annual production of skilled manpower under

the assumption of no emigration is known.

Now if emigration occurs and the

government continues to subsidize students to the same extent B::/ before,
the nu~Jer remaining in the country will decrease.

The stock of skilled

manpower in the country wi.11 become constant at some equilibrium level smal
ler than in the closed economy; hence the ,rngc will be higher.

The trai.nins

of .another wo;:ker would clearly pay off if the government could b2 sure tbat
he would stay in the country, sine~ th~ marginal productivity of this type of
labor is now higher than it was in the closed economy and the costs of train
ing are ~resumably the same. 1

But if he emigrates early in life then the

investment in him is thought of by the government' as being lost.

Hhether the

1 rt is assumed that the government is interested in max1m1z1ng the
total income of everyone in the economy. ThusJ for education to pay off
.it i.s not necessary that it pay off for anyone but the individual on whom
the expenditure is incurred. So the sense in which an investment does not
pay off if the individual emigrates is simply that with his emigration the
governoent's intere~t in him suddenly disappears. This may appea~ to be
a rather strange concept but it is implicit in the assumptions which have
been made above. The government is, concerned only with the set of ind iv i
time, and in discounting future income
duals in the country at a point
it concerns itself only with the set of individuals in the country at each
given point in the future. So the improvement in the welfare of any in
dividual is counted only as long as he remains in the country.

in

..:..

•

•'

I

-22government should now undertake a more or less rapid production of high••
I

skilled labor than in ·the closed economy depends on the way in which the
probability that a worker will emigrate from the country depends on the wage

he receives in the country.
The relevant relationships are illustratetl diagramatically in Figure 5.
· O_n tht right side the stock of skilled labor in the economy is measured on the horizontal axis.

The line,

CC' , gives the total cost per unit of skil

led labor educated as a function of the stock of skilled labor.

The benefits,

measured as the difference between the wage streams for skilled and unskilled
labor over the working life of the individual, discounted to present v.:ilue,
are also a function of the stock of skilled la~or, 1 and the line

BB'

· the benefit resulting from the addition of one more skilled laborer.

gives
The

HsWs I gives the ·wage rate of skilled labor as a function of its stock

line

and the line

wuHu I

gives the wage of unskilled labor as a function of the

stock of skilled labor,

BB'

is derived as the vert~cal distance between

these two lines.

It has a negative slope.

BB I

gives the optimal stock of labor in an economy from ,-,h ich

at point

F

The intE:rsection of

CC'

ancl

there is no emigration.
The height of the line
labor.

The distance between

t·lswHs,.r'
BB

and

gives the world wase rate for skilled
Hs,Ps,.7'

(given by. the. curve

DD) re.,.

presents the differenc~ b~tween the world and domestic skilled labor wage
rates as a function of the domestic stock of skilled l3bor,
In the left half of Figure 5 the curve

JJ 1

relates the percent of

lAlternatively, both costs and benefits could be measured in terms of
weeks or months, with the cost then being that weekli or monthly amount which
if it had to be p:_ricl over the inclividt.l--c,1 1 s ,wrld.ng life a;:1d ,-.1 ere discour.tec1
to present value would just equal the actual cosf of the education.
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working life spent in the country of origin, measured on the horizontal axis,
to the wage differential, measured on the vertical axis.

The larger the wage

~iffercntial, tl1e greater is the likelihood of emigration for the representa
tive worker and/or the greater percentage of his working life will be _spent
outside the country.

It is assumed that when the domestic and foreign wage

rates are equal individuals will spend their whole working life in their coun
try of origin.
The curve

tt

relates the percent of working life spent at home to the

average cost of the stock of skilled labor in terms of educational expenditures.
If there is no migrrttion (tl1e per cent of working life spent at home is 100),
the average cost of maintaining a stock of skilled labor is given by

OC •

How

ever if the representative person educated spends only 50 per cent of his work
ing life in the country, then the average cost of the stock of skilled labor
is twice

OC .

It is ncM possible to show how the stock of skilled labor is related to
the average cost per unit educated.

If the stock is

OL1, then the domestic

wage differential betm~en skilled and unskilled. labor is given by. L1A1 , and
the differential between the domestic and world wages for skilled labor by

L1E1, also equal (by construction) to
spent at home is given by

OG1 .

G1H1 .

The per cent of working life

The average cost of the stock of skilled

labor given that the per·cent of working life spent at home is
to

G1K1

or equivalently

yields an average cost of

OG1, is equal

L1M1 . , A similar procedure for the stock
L2M2

012

The locus of such points gives an average

cost curve in the presence of possible emigration as defined by the curve
JJ'

This curve is r:;iven by

CPHi1·I1Q

Under the extreme nssumption that the government has to pay the.full

cost of education, the optimal capital stock can be deduced from the point
at which the

M2N 1Q .

curve

stock would be

BB'

1 ini:~ intersects the curve marginal to the aver2ge cost

The marginal curve is given by

OL 3 •

CPRS, so the equilibrium

The optimal capital stock is, as one would expec~,

smaller than it would be if emigration uere not a possibility.

The number

of people being educated may be greater or less than in the no emigration

case.
In a situation where there is no emigration the optimal amount of edu
cation is the seme whether there is no rish: aversion or imperfection of
capital m;:irkets (so that individuals can pay for their own education) or
whether there are such imperfections and the government is required to make
the~ payments.

1:!1ere government subsidies are requi~ec1 but ar.e only pa1:tial

payments of the total cost of education, it is still correct to represent
the benefits curve by

BB, but the marginal costs and average costs to the

non-emigrants can no longer be represented as they ~re here.

Suppose, for

example, that the emigrant pays SO.per cent of the costs of his education
and the re.st is met by government subsidy.

Then the height of the 2vcrage

cost curve per unit of stock of skilled labor is equal to the vertical
distance

OC (representing the full educatiorial cost of an individual who

does stay in the country) plus 50 per cent of the addition to the average
cost per unit stock retained in the country re:,ulting from the fact that
some emigrate.
the

CC

Hence, the average cost curve in this situation would be

curve to the ri~;ht as far as the point

half as much above the

N/f1Q1 .

CC

P

and then would be one

curve as is our original uverage cost curve

The relevant marginal cost curve ,wuld be m2~·ginal

defined average cost curve.

to· this

newly

The equilibrit!m amount of educ,2tion would

-25clearly be larger in the situation where a larger proportio n of the cost is
borne by the individua l recd.ving the education .

Governmen t Wage

l'EL!~J-es

An alternati ve to a policy of subsidies to education as a means of maintaining a desired stock of skilled labor is a ~olicy of subsidizi ng wages,
which would reduce emigratio n of a given type of skilled labor by reducing,
for thc:it type of labor, the wage diffcrent icl between this country and the
rest of the world.

Such a policy never pays in the short run.

This proposi-

tion is illustrate d in Figure 6 (which correspon ds to Figure 1) where tht:!
loss to the n~_n-emigra_nts from th_e departure of
by .the trj.angle

BCD.

L1L2

workers is measured

The amount which non-migta nts would have to pay to

ell of these potential migrants to persuade them to remain in the country
Since the area of

is great-

ACBD

is given by the rectangul ar area

ACBD

er than the area of the triangle

BCD, the p~licy would cost the non

emigrants more than they would. gain by having· the emigrants remain.
The conclusio n derived in the short-run static case does not always
hold in the dynamic

C<'.S,;

where there are governmen t subsidies to eclucc:tion .

Figure 7, of the same general format as Figure 5, shows hot,J the ·wage sub
sidy policy could benefit the non-emig rants.

Assume that the governmen t

'

already has an optimal education sibsidy policy, as defined in Figure S, and
as a result, the stock of skilled labor is

OL

3

.

Without asking whether it

is an optimal policy we arbitrari ly assume the governmen t subsidize s wages

of .skilled labor by an amount
curve

DD'

downwards to

D5 D9 '

DDS
•

1

This shifts the wage different ial

The original average cost and marginal

1It would be possible to discuss the choice of the optimal wage sub
sidy but ue are here co,1ccrned only \,ith. sho,.;ing that sor:1e subsidies can
b,e beneficia l.

.
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ccst cu::-vcs oE t:i'.' s!:~_llH1. V:bo::.:- 3toc1~ c1re

.

anu

CPQ

and

respectiv ely.

CPRS .

The new ones,

By following through

!:iw :og:.c illustrc:,t0 .cl in :i'i 0 m:e 5, one c.:in see that the new average cost
c~cve

CTQ 1

is to the ri.zht of t~:e o.:.::i.einEtl by the ho?:izonta l distance beanc1

Ds·i) s

I

Th~ total c..1b::;idy w1_1ich is paid to skilled laborers
is n p~y2~nt from non-emig rants to people who

would h~vc e~iz~nt~i in the ab~ence of the policy.

The net contribut ion of

In our di2-gr2m this gain is clearly

Until no~1 ue h::ive been coace:::r:i::cd either with a "St.::tj_c or short-run

ccc:-,:;r:7 in whi.ch t!1::::c~ ic. ;.:::; a:ljustr.~en t of factor p:.:oportio ns except that
:?:esuJ. ting c.i.!.·2ctly £::::-o~ 1x:.e~:·at~ i-:m; ·or, Fith a stationar y dynarnic econo~r,y in
,hJ.c:i c~.thc;: inf:i.nitc tine. is available for the systc:n to readjust to shocks
o~ whe=c all exogenous ch2n3cs nre fo:::2seen and planned for.

It is clear

th3t n0ithcr of these two systc~s is the relevant cme for the analysis of
,.:.:.st ccu1~-::ri.es an:l t~12.t in c::::-c~er to i-:t c:. r:iore appropria te ans~•7er to the

1,~tv~ been use:~~ b.qr;j_cal ly c-3C.::u::;e ::!1ey gi.v2. a simpl-::r base from which to an~..

in the ei.·o~-;ir.~ cco:x::.y.

A,1:: e:uir;r.:,ti.. :n r1ill lead in the short run to the

3t.:i.tic t:,pe l(•.:s dis-::i:.3S(;::1. ci::-lier i.: this pap:.:::...· snd will set up the reac-·
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Pne might expect that, in a growing econonv, the departure of people
with low savings rates would benefit the non-emigrants in a long run sense,
even though there might be the usual short run loss.
happens in this case,

But consider what

The rate of return to capital formation will decrease

since, because the non-emigrants had a higher-savings ratio than the emi
grants, the ratio of labor to capital will now be lower than it would have
been had the emigration not occurred and the marginal productivity of any
given amount of capital will be lower.

He know from our earlier analysis

of the dynamic stationary economy that the increase in wages of the non
emigrants is insufficient· to offset the decJ:ease in non-wage incomes.

This

initial decrease in.income is felt also in the growing economy and coupled
with it is a

decrease in the return to savings, which will. probably lowe.:

the rate of capital formation of the non--emigrants below what it would have
had the emigration not occurred.

It is true,·~£ course, that the average

growth rate of the economy as a whole. will probably be higher after the emi
gration than before it; but this is just.another example of the apparent
paradox first referred to in our short-run analysis above (see page

).

If the emigration had not occurred, the non-emigrants wouLd have gained
even faster than they now gain, while the emigrants, having a lower income
per capita ,rnuld. have kept the average income per capita down below what
it currently is, and would have had a more slowly growing income level.l

_ 1It is interesting to ask how our results would be affected if we
allo~.;ed for embodied technical change. If the rate of technological pro
gress was an increasing function of total investment in the econor:1y as a
whole, it too would be decreased by the emigration, since total investment
would be decreased. If, however, the rate of technological progress de
pended positively on such a variable as the capital-labor ratio, our results
could be reversed,

